The Chinese have been very belligerent with India in the past few days. After a confrontation started between Indian and Chinese troops at Dokalam, near Sikkim and Bhutan, a Chinese Newspaper, one that is a government mouthpiece, asked Indian troops to leave the Dokalam area ‘with dignity or be kicked out’. They also warned us that we will face greater losses than in 1962.
Harsh words.
The Chinese are an entirely different culture, and so, very obviously, it is difficult for us to understand them. But there are a few books that give a good idea of how Chinese geostrategic thinking works. I have listed these books in the sources. Since the Chinese are such a different culture, one gets to know a very different system of thought, which is a very useful thing, for it allows one to examine where one stands.
So the first Chinese conundrum. The Chinese hate going to war. Yet they are never at peace.
Chinese thinking on geostrategic kind of matters is, according to the great Henry Kissinger, similar to the game ‘Go’. They are perpetually seeking positional advantage, seeking to encircle, seeking to overwhelm. The central belief is that the ultimate achievement of a strategist is to gain victory without fighting, simply by surrounding and overwhelming an opponent. The Chinese fight only when no other option is workable. To have to resort to blows is something of a defeat in itself.
Encircle. Overwhelm. Advance. Repeat.
This is what they did in the South China Sea, which they have already won, without firing a shot. It was an impressive piece of diplomatic frogboiling. The Philippine President, for example, unthinkingly rocked his friendship with America, called Obama names, said he was with the Chinese because the Americans were a sinking ship, all in order to cosy up to the Chinese and to get them to back off. For his troubles he was threatened with war by China. All it took to pacify the Philippines was a sentence from Xi, threatening war if the Philippines drilled for oil in the South China sea.
This is also what the Chinese do at the Indian border, which they dominate, and where they have been certain since 1962, that India will not undertake an offensive.
This is what they do using North Korea against America, which is being incrementally throttled into accepting a madman with nukes and ICBMs aimed at their cities.
This is what they do in the North Asian seas facing South Korea and Japan, where they face cultures that think just like them, and where, therefore, they have had limited success.
This is their way with Taiwan, which they will surely gobble up, but which they are in no hurry to gobble up.
Every single Chinese border is ‘hot’ because the Chinese always seek to dominate it. There is always the next atoll, the next ridge, the next peak that would make their position stronger, and they continually seek it. But their strategic culture is not merely borderland incrementalism. It is the relentless pursuit of strategic encirclement. It is to get such a hold on your opponent in peace that he cannot even contemplate war. Here is Kissinger describing Chinese thinking:
“…Discussing China on CNN Sunday, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said that “One has to understand the Chinese intellectual game, which is what we call go (and) they call weiqi.” Explaining that “it’s a game of strategic encirclement,” Kissinger said that “our intellectual game is chess. Chess is about victory or defeat. Somebody wins.” Kissinger contrasted chess in which “all the pieces are in front of you at all times, so you can calculate your risk” with go, where the pieces “are not all on the board, and your opponent is always capable of introducing new pieces.” Historically, Kissinger said, the Chinese use strategic analysis based on “the go way.”…”
The contrast with India could not be starker.
Our strategic thinking is more akin to ludo (ok, chopad). We get to the board completely unprepared and pray to the lord to roll us a six. Strategic acumen is loading the dice (and therefore Shakuni is a strategist)! While China maintains relentless pressure on the Indian border, we fail to dominate even Pakistan because we alternate between Prime Ministerial smooch fests, and brutal mountain wars, pointless artillery duels, suicidal military raids; and we have not an inch of land or a grain of awe to show after seventy years at it. At the India – Pakistan border soldiers routinely die and are dismembered over nothing. There have been four wars and zero changes. On the India-China border, on the other hand, where not a bullet has been fired in the last forty years, the net result, in the words of an Indian strategist, is:
“… Bite by kilometre-sized bite, China is eating away at India’s Himalayan borderlands. For decades, Asia’s two giants have fought a bulletless war for territory along their high-altitude border. Recently, though, China has become more assertive, underscoring the need for a new Indian containment strategy. On average, China launches one stealth incursion into India every 24 hours. Mr Kiren Rijiju, India’s Minister of State for Home Affairs, says the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is actively intruding into vacant border space with the objective of occupying it. And according to a former top official with India’s Intelligence Bureau, India has lost nearly 2,000 sq km to PLA encroachments over the past decade…”
The right way, then, to look at the Dokalam standoff is that we are already at war with China. They’re playing Go. We are playing ludo. And so it is that if China manages to penetrate deep towards the narrow stretch of land connecting India to the North East, we would not, in the near future, have the option of even defending Arunachal, which would mean that we would not even have the option to go to war.
So that was the first Chinese conundrum (the Chinese hate going to war, yet they are never at peace).
The second Chinese conundrum is deliciously diabolical too. The Chinese use force as a last resort. Yet they are very quick to use force.
The Chinese use force as a last resort, and are extremely careful about going to war. When they went to war against Vietnam in 1979, for example, Kissinger describes how, months before the war, Deng traveled all over Asia painting Vietnam as a danger to peace. He even approached the US, months in advance again, to enquire as to what it would do if the Vietnamese attacked China (ha ha, I mean it just takes the cake). Similar care and reluctance to go to war marked the 1962 China – India war. They approached Nehru with what they believed to be ‘reasonable’ offers in 1960. They were rebuffed. At around this time, andthis was 1960, the Chinese concluded conflict to be approaching and inevitable. When it came they claimed, in my view not without reason, that they had been ‘forced’ into war by Nehru’s inability to grasp the weakness of his military position and his intransigence to ‘reasonable’ Chinese offers. One important aim of the war was to wake Nehru up to reality. Another was to demoralize India, but more about that later, what I want to highlight here is their reluctance to go to war, and that they prepare meticulously.
However, and this is what makes the conundrum so tasty, the Chinese feel that because the application of force must be judicious, minimal, they prefer to use force early in a contest, because using it late will require more of it, which would be injudicious and wasteful. And so, there is always a very real danger that the Chinese will resort to war when one least expects it, simply because the Chinese usually conclude that if they have to fight, then it is better to go to war at the very earliest. This is the reason why, while the Chinese believe they were very patient with India in 1962, we Indians believe they started a war when there was no need for one. Pre-emptive counter attacks (I know, it is a contradiction in terms) are a well accepted concept in Chinese thinking.
The Chinese, however, remained judicious in their use of force even when they won a surprisingly easy victory over India in 1962. Having won their objectives, they withdrew. They believed that any more force would have driven us to America, and they did not want to deliver India into America’s lap. That would have defeated the very purpose of the war, which was to demoralize India and to show Nehru the actual military balance, not to leave it writhing for revenge.
Again, the contrast with India could not be starker. In our history since 1947, I think 1971 was the one instance we came close to this sort of approach. We are 'no first use' in everything from grenades to nukes. Unsurprisingly, we usually use force too late, and therefore are forced to use huge amounts of it. Perhaps the surgical strike undertaken recently by PM Modi will develop into something approaching the way China works. We certainly have been getting much better on such matters lately.
But, for the present, one can comfortably say that our usual way is essentially like Kargil, 1999, where we woke up to a Pakistani invasion after they had occupied the heights, and then we fought them against all odds in areas where they occupied the high ground, in effect sacrificing Indian soldiers to honor the fundamental Pakistani insurance behind a Kargil kind of incursion, which was that India would not mount a full scale war even in the face of the gravest of provocations. These days we wonder how we can convince Pakistan that we are serious and will fight. We wonder how we will deal with Pakistan if (and when) it blows up sending a radioactive shower on our cities. And we wrack our national soul with painful inquisitions on our commitment to secularism in Kashmir, and we also wonder, paradoxically, how we can make the Pakistanis feel nice and warm about us. China, on the other hand, aims “…”to take Taiwan whole and intact … without ever resorting to force," using economic, military and diplomatic levers….”
Really, we should learn.
And that is that on the second Chinese conundrum: the Chinese use force as a last resort, yet they are very quick to use force.
The third Chinese conundrum is again complex. The Chinese are not driven by emotion, nor by the sub-continental sense of fighting for ‘honor’ or 'pride'. Yet, they place paramount importance on psychological objectives in statecraft because they seek to dominate.
Unlike India, or particularly Pakistan, the other subcontinental power and our cultural cousin, which will go to war to avenge perceived insults, to even the body count, to assuage public opinion, the Chinese go to war with far more concrete aims. Like they go to war to humiliate an enemy so thoroughly that it is unable to gather the will to fight again. They seek to stamp psychological dominance. Time and again, against India in 1962, against Vietnam in 1979, the Chinese have won territory but withdrawn. Part of it has to do with the great cost associated with holding enemy territory, especially in the face of guerilla war. But a large part of it is also because in the Chinese way war is in the mind, not on the ground.
When he began the war in 1962, Mao said: “Since Nehru sticks his head out and insists on us fighting him, for us not to fight with him would not be friendly enough; courtesy emphasizes reciprocity.” When he was done a few days later, he gave up all occupied territory and boasted that he has dealt with the Indian threat for a generation. It was true.
But let us ask why? Why did he give up the land in order to emphasize the blow?
Well, here is his answer and a great lesson on the Chinese way: “People may ask if there is contradiction to abandon a territory gained by heroic battle. Does it mean that the heroic fighters shed their blood in vain and to no purpose? This is to put the wrong question. Does one eat to no purpose simply because he relieves himself later? Does one sleep in vain because one wakes up and goes about? I do not think the questions should be asked thus; rather one should keep on eating and sleeping or fighting. These are illusions born out of subjectivism and formalism and do not exist in real life."
Who is to say that they haven't learnt more from the Buddha than us?
We should be flattered that the Chinese are concerned about us enough to try to encircle us with ports and roads. Clearly, they know we are coming for them. They know India can be a very dangerous opponent. The opium wars, after all, were fought by Indian soldiers. And Indian soldiers were involved in the sacking of the Summer Palace, which is the signature event of what the Chinese call their century of humiliation, the wound that will never heal.
It is funny, but it is true, that we have lost our historical memory. But China remembers. There was a time, under the British, when Indian soldiers helped conquer the world. China is prudent enough to consider that some day perhaps we will regain memory of that time and wonder why we shouldn't do it again, this time for ourselves.
Here is Gen JFR Jacob writing about the way China sees india:
“…To put Sino-Indian relations into perspective, it is necessary to look at from a historical as well as a strategic context. Let me begin from the Second Opium War in1860 in which Indian troops took part. Four brigades of British and Indian infantry (Sikh Regiment, Madras Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry and the Ludhiana Rifles) and one cavalry brigade, which included Probyn's Horse, took part in these operations, in which the Summer Palace in Peking was sacked and looted. I recall a Chinese general telling me in 1957: "We, Chinese, will never forget that Indian troops took part in the sacking of the Summer Palace."…”
Perhaps China sees we are becoming stronger. Perhaps it sees that we are developing a capacity for geostrategic thought that will, in a few years, match China. We sure are learning fast. Military exercises with Japan. Pre emptive strikes and lots of other dirty tricks against Pakistan. India is showing a breadth of vision and a willingness to run risks that have grabbed China's attention.
The Chinese will do everything in their power to stop us.
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Bhuwan Singh writes on Indian politics and publishes on Facebook and Kindle. Kindly "Like” the Facebook page to be alerted on future Facebook posts. https://www.facebook.com/bhuwansinghwriter/. You can buy his books at http://www.amazon.in/Bhuwan-Singh/e/B00E9O5X9Q.
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Sources:
Dokalam stand off: http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/leave-sikkim-dokalam-area-with-dignity-or-be-kicked-out-chinese-media-117070500295_1.html
Kissinger on China and Go: http://www.usgo.org/news/2011/01/kissinger-on-go-and-chinese-strategic-thinking/ and http://www.henryakissinger.com/articles/nw110404.html
Go: https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/munk-debates/weiqi-the-game-that-holds-chinas-key-to-world-domination/article598664/
North Korea; https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/07/the-worst-problem-on-earth/528717/
Philippines: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/19/world/asia/philippines-south-china-sea-duterte-war.html?mcubz=2
Indian border: http://www.todayonline.com/commentary/india-must-bare-teeth-face-chinas-high-altitude-land-grab
China India conflict 1962: https://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/09/23/weekend-panorama-kissinger%E2%80%99s-china-india%E2%80%99s-neighbor/
China, India, 1960: http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/crossing-the-point-of-no-return/article4028362.ece
CIA view on the Indo China conflict: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/polo-08.pdf
Mao on 1962: http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/nov/15chin.htm
Gen Jacob: http://www.sify.com/news/sino-indian-ties-what-the-dragon-wont-forget-imagegallery-national-jgsm5Jdfbejsi.html
Kissinger: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/kissinger-order-and-chaos/506876/
The Books:
https://www.amazon.in/China-History-John-Keay-ebook/dp/B003GUBIH0
https://www.amazon.in/1962-Wasnt-Shiv-Kunal-Verma-ebook/dp/B01A4BKRVG
https://www.amazon.in/China-Henry-Kissinger-ebook/dp/B004XIZLAY